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S
ome economists, policymakers, and pundits view the
financial turmoil that began in August 2007 as the worst
financial shock to the U.S. economy since the end of
World War II. Some even assert that it amounts to the worst
financial crisis since the 1930s. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve
and other government agencies have taken aggressive actions to
support the financial system and spur economic growth. Other
economists and analysts, citing continued modest loan growth
and relatively few bank failures last year (compared with, say,
the late 1980s and early 1990s), do not share this view. Regard  -
less, many banks have announced sharp earnings declines, and
the possibility of further financial losses looms large.
A well-functioning financial sector is crucial to the perfor  -
mance of the U.S. economy. In a market-based economy, the
financial sector channels the supply of funds from savers to the
demands of borrowers, which supports the wealth-creating abili-
ties of the entrepreneurial sector. At the same time, the perfor  -
mance of the financial sector also depends crucially on the health
of the U.S. economy. Typically, growth of loans and leases at
commercial banks declines sharply before a recession.
Clearly, bank actions to limit the credit supply can exacerbate
an economic downturn. For example, banks typically tighten
credit standards and/or loan terms as the economy weakens and
nonperforming loans increase. But an adverse shock from out-
side the financial sector can be just as important—such as a
sharp increase in oil prices or a plunge in house prices. Such
shocks also slow the demand for credit because of weaker future
growth of incomes and profits. In large and open economies,
forces that trigger changes in the supply and demand for credit
are often synchronized and difficult to distinguish.
Thus, it is not surprising that bank loans slowed when GDP
growth slowed: When GDP averaged 2.7 percent for 2004-07,
the growth of bank loans averaged 11.4 percent per year; when
GDP fell slightly in 2008, growth of bank loans slowed to 5.6
percent. Most forecasters expect recessionary conditions through
the first half of 2009, so continued weak growth of bank loans
is likely. Indeed, in the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions, the year-
to-year percentage decline in bank loans did not reach a trough
until February 1993 and March 2002, respectively.
Other factors have weakened household and business spend-
ing in the current recession and thus have adversely affected the
supply and demand for bank loans. A 52 percent drop in the S&P
500 stock price index from October 9, 2007, to November 20,
2008, accompanied the oil shock and fall in house prices. Accord  -
ingly, household net worth (financial and tangible net wealth) fell
by about $7 trillion between 2007:Q2 and 2008:Q3. Another key
factor has been the simultaneous slowing in economic growth in
most of the world’s largest economies, which is important because
exports were a key source of U.S. economic growth in 2004-07.
Some claim the key cause of slower growth has been the losses
and write-downs incurred by banks and other financial institutions
that hold asset-backed securities (ABS) on their balance sheets.1
In particular, prices of nonprime mortgage–related ABS have plum-
meted in part because of rising mortgage defaults and foreclosures
stemming from falling house prices and a weakening economy.
Because many of these ABS are no longer actively traded, determin-
ing their price—and thus the impact on the banking system’s lend-
ing capacity—has been a key source of the uncertainty in financial
markets. As a result, many firms have been extremely cautious in
lending because of the perceived risk in lending to parties who may
have substantial ABS losses. Some estimate that these losses may
eventually exceed $2 trillion, but even those estimates depend impor-
tantly on the pace of economic recovery. Moreover, not all firms
hold ABS on their balance sheets, so the perception of increased
credit risk—arising in part from poor macroeconomic conditions—
has affected markets more broadly.
A report prepared for the 2008 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum
argued that the financial crisis will begin to wane when (i) banks
and other financial institutions can raise enough new equity capital
to improve their balance sheets and (ii) risk and uncertainty recede
enough that firms are less reticent about making loans.2 A more
stable macroeconomic environment will go far toward achieving
this outcome.
—Kevin L. Kliesen
1 This development is a by-product of the securitization of a wide swath of the
U.S. credit markets that has created a so-called shadow banking system.
2 Greenlaw, David; Hatzius, Jan; Kashyyap, Anil, K. and Shin, Hyun S. “Leveraged
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MPFReport-final.pdf.
Putting the Financial Crisis and 
Lending Activity in a Broader Context
research.stlouisfed.org